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Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law
William W. Bratton

INTRODUCTION

Bill Klein extends an idealistic and progressive invitation with the Criteria
for Good Laws of Business Association' (the Criteria). The structure of our
debates, he says, prevents us from joining the issue. The discourse will move
forward if we can isolate core components on which we agree and disagree.
The invitation, thus directed, is well-constructed. To facilitate engagement,
each criterion is set out as pari passu with each other. And there is a good
reason for the inclusion of each listed criterion. Each has an established place in
public and private law jurisprudence. Each has influenced results, coming forth
as salient in one or another area of law, in one or another regulation or case. We
can, then, agree in the abstract to take each criterion seriously. Klein bids us
then to cull, modify, and restate, so as to identify more clearly the goals we
hold out for corporate law. The remainder of this essay takes up that invitation,
taking our debates to the Criteria, taking the Criteria to our debates, and taking
both to the law itself. It suggests that the criteria on which we can agree lie at a
higher level of generality than the Criteria: corporate law makes us all welfare
consequentialists 2 who agree that good corporate law is about encouraging
productivity. We differ over the means to that end in debates that have over
time evolved away from the ideological and toward the functional. Absent an
ex ante set of empirically verifiable formulas for productive business
organization, we are left to our debates.
Part I offers a contrasting conceptual framework-a list of ongoing,
unresolved debates and their principal components. Part II goes on to identify
two core and generally accepted objectives in the corporate law we have
inherited-freedom of action for management and the minimization of the cost
of capital. Part III evaluates the two theoretical paradigms that dominated
corporate law during the 20th century, the trust paradigm of Berle and Means
and the contractarian paradigm of law and economics, showing that each in
turn lost salience due to a failure to adhere strictly to the core objectives thus
identified. Part IV considers the firm's legal boundaries, showing that they too
follow from the core objectives and that their adherence to those objectives

1. 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 13 (2005).
2. At least in the tight confines of corporate law discussions. In the context of our debates, a
morally motivated case for, say, constituent rights will be accompanied by a fully developed
consequential case. A given discussant's grounding of a case in economic welfare does not necessarily
imply a philosophical attachment to consequentialism.
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triggers resistance to theoretical calls for social responsibility and constituent
empowerment. Part V turns to the terms of the shareholder-manager agency
relation, a subject matter implicating tensions between the dual purposes of
freedom of action for management and the minimization of the cost of capital.
Corporate law mediates these tensions with open-ended terms and piecemeal
resolutions. Although theorists have offered meta-level means to resolve the
tensions, the practice has never responded by endorsing these theories.
I. CATEGORIES OF DEBATE

The Criteria come forth as a series of independent normative assertions. They
do not interact, interrogating one another. Such an interactive process would
trigger debates with predictable patterns. Four such patterns are described
below, each comprised of binary opposite positions. Multiple conceptual
overlaps spill across the four categories; political, methodological, and
doctrinal affinities vary from debate to debate. Thus might a given discussant
gravitate to a right-side position in one debate and a left-side position in
another debate. But one constant perspective unifies one side of the binaries in
all four categories: mainstream law and economics writers are likely to
gravitate to the right side in every discussion.
Category (1): Debates about the appropriatescope of regulation and the
degree of reliance accorded private ordering in solving problems. Three

binaries describe positions taken in these debates:
Public v. private
Mandatory v. enabling
Federal v. state
The public/private contrast concerns the characterization of the problem,
public denoting a wide range of affected interests and subject matter
appropriate for regulation and private denoting a narrow range of interests
limited to a class of voluntary participants. The mandatory/enabling contrast
goes to the mode of regulatory response, with mandates constraining choices of
actors in firms and enabling responses leaving them the option of framing their
own regulations. The federal/state binary references the historic pattern of
regulatory allocation. Under an informal federalism norm, federal law
addresses trading markets, adding disclosure, antifraud, and insider trading
mandates in pursuit of a stated public interest. All other corporate subject
matters concern internal affairs and presumptively are left to the states. The
states, constrained by the charter competition system, privilege private ordering
and enabling solutions. But, because the federal-state regulatory allocation is
not set constitutionally, the presumption favoring state control periodically
yields to new federal regulation, triggering ongoing debate.
Category (2): Debates about the objectives of regulation and normative
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priorities.Five binaries capture the tenor of these debates:
Trust v. contract
Fairness v. efficiency
Substance v. process
Protection of expectations v. dynamism
State enforcement v. reputational enforcement
Positions described by these binaries amount to more particular expressions
of the concepts motivating the first category of debates: a public
characterization and a willingness to motivate the left-side binaries, while a
private characterization and a preference for private ordering solutions motivate
those on the right side. The left side implants the concept of trust at the legal
firm's core. It asserts that corporate law empowers managers without imposing
the requisite degree of responsibility. It follows that corporate law should
impose substantive duties of fair dealing to protect the expectations of the
firm's disempowered actors. Private ordering being inadequate to achieve these
purposes, state enforcement is necessary. Arguments from the right side use the
concept of contract to impel the legal firm toward the end of permitting more
efficient dispositions of assets in a dynamic economic environment. A
preference for reputational enforcement follows. For some it also follows that
fiduciary law should be subject to reversal by private ordering. And, where
fiduciary interventions do occur, process solutions that remit decision to actors
within the firm are preferred to direct review of management action.
Category (3): Debates about the boundaries of the firm and the firm's

responsibilityto outsiders. Here a single binary captures the matters at stake:
Outsiders (other constituents) v. insiders (shareholders and managers)
The outsiders appear on a standard list of corporate constituents excluded
from corporate fiduciary protection and remitted to self-protection through
contract-employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, and communities.
Debates over this hard result touch on a range of subject matters, including
limited liability, takeover defense, employee rights, and financial contract
interpretation. Discussants draw on the concepts described in categories (1) and
(2), ranging public values, fairness, and protection of expectations against
private ordering, contract, and dynamism.
Category (4): Debates about the terms of the corporate agency relationship
and the allocation of authority within the firm. Here three binaries suggest

themselves:
Entity v. agency
Management discretion v. shareholder choice
Managerialism v. shareholder value
These debates follow from a theoretical ambiguity at the base of corporate
doctrine. In the classical doctrinal conception, the corporation is an entity and
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the powers of the board of directors are original and undelegated. Even as the
shareholders elect the board, they are not accorded the rights of principals in an
agency relationship. Unfortunately for the goal of doctrinal coherence,
corporate law also frequently lapses into an agency characterization, the lapses
being much encouraged by the economic theory of agency. The ambiguity in
the legal model opens the way for an ongoing contest over the line dividing
management and shareholder authority within the firm, a contest centered on
topics like shareholder access, proxy regulation, and takeover defense.
Summary. The dialectic presentation implies that the debates do not resolve,
with meta-political preferences and unverified notions about productive
incentive alignments determining arguments made and conclusions drawn. But
dialectic can lead to synthesis, if not in the abstract, then in history. Indeed,
legal doctrine synthesizes dialectically opposed positions in practice. Famous
cases achieve high-profile status for the very reason that binary opposites from
theoretical debates come to play on their facts. Courts work through the
dialectic tensions in situation-specific ways, making no attempt at general
theoretical resolution. The process is similar, although more highly politicized,
when a proposed regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission works
its way through the notice and comment process. Restating, the law mediates
theoretical disputes in specific situations.
II. DOCTRINAL CONTEXT: THE PURPOSES OF CORPORATE LAW

If it is synthesis that interests us, then we need to look at practice as well as
theory. Concepts competing in our dialectical debates have operated in history
so as to determine regulatory results, bequeathing a context. Now, a regulatory
framework cannot by virtue of its own existence establish its own legitimacy
(or goodness). It takes a theory to do that. Nor does competitive evolution in
history guarantee a single, first-best contextual outcome. Comparative
corporate governance teaches us that ours is only one of many possible legal
frameworks within which actors can competitively produce a widget or
construct and operate a communications network.3 Nor, finally, can it be
asserted that the context controls. The normative enterprise is theoretical, and at
a theoretical level everything remains contestable even if the doctrinal context
tends toward stasis.
But the context does provide a framework for taking stock of our categories
of debate and for sorting the Criteria. Some of the debates go directly to

3. See, e.g., Marco Becht et at., CorporateGovernance and Control 58 (ECGI Finance Working
Paper No. 02, 2002), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-343461 ("It is not possible to conclude on the
basis of economic analysis alone that there is a unique set of optimal rules that are universally applicable
to all corporations and economies, just as there is no single political constitution that is universally best
for all nations.").
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cutting-edge doctrinal issues; others proceed despite settled doctrinal results,
challenging the context. Similarly, some Criteria prove salient and determine
results. Others matter less. Some matter not at all. If we were to accept all of
the Criteria in theory, the sorting process would teach us how good or bad
corporate law is. Contrariwise, to the extent we accept a doctrinal result that
traverses a criterion, we eliminate it from the list. In the alterative, we may just
disagree about the fit between the Criteria and the context, returning to our
dialectical debates.
Turning to the context, a bottom line purpose of corporate law can be
identified readily. The purpose is economic: drawing on the usual formulation,
corporate law seeks to maximize the wealth generated by firms. That usual
formulation might be relaxed in recognition of the fact that no one really knows
when wealth has been maximized: corporate law should facilitate the attempt to
maximize the value of the firm. A narrower formulation favored by
many-maximizing shareholder value-is deliberately avoided here. The
shareholder value maximization norm follows from a particular theory of the
optimal incentive alignment within the firm, a concept contestable in theory.4
That theory, while influential in practice, has never been determinative.
The general purpose of wealth maximization can be broken down into two
primary components, each of which implies a corollary.
ASSET SIDE
Facilitate long-term investment

Facilitate delegation of
decisionmaking
(State corporate law)

LIABILITY SIDE
Facilitate lowest cost of
capital

Facilitate liquid market
(Federal securities law)

4. Reference is made to theoretical models addressing optimal arrangements for sharing and
transferring control between debt and equity interests. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An
Incomplete Contracts Approach to FinancialContracting, 59 REv. ECON. STUD. 473 (1992); Mathias

Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and ManagerShareholder Congruence, 109 Q.J. ECON. 1027 (1994). See also Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got There, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them
15 (ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 44, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-561305
("[Clonsistent with 'stakeholder theory' value-maximizing firms will be concerned about relations with
all their constituencies. A firm cannot maximize value if it ignores the interest of its stakeholders.").
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One set can be situated on the left side of the balance sheet, and the other on the
right side. On the left side, it is corporate law's job to encourage long-term
investment and the risk-taking implicated therein. That purpose implies a
corollary-facilitation of a delegation of decision-making authority from the
providers of capital to the expert managers who deploy it. (The corollary
extends over to the right side of the balance sheet to include substantial
management discretion over financing.) On the right side, it is corporate law's
job to facilitate investment in producing assets at the lowest possible cost of
capital. A corollary again is implied: the law should secure the presence of
liquid trading markets in corporate securities. With the objectives in place,
corporate law articulates means to the ends. The evaluative framework is
functional and consequential, so the word "effective" may better describe the
emerging criteria than does the term "good."
This sounds like an attempt at high theory: abstract criteria placed on the
table to compete with Klein's. And, in fact, at this level of generality, I would
predict widespread theoretical concurrence. Even so, the present exercise is
descriptive and the subject matter is the doctrine. State corporate law emerged
in its present form in New Jersey between 1888 and 1896, taking shape as an
enabling regime that accorded management a zone of freedom of action
respecting assets and finance. The means to the end was mandated management
agenda control over investment and financing decisions, the terms of the
corporate contract, and corporate combinations. The framework changed little
during the twentieth century. Subsequent innovation occurred primarily at the
federal level, centering on the federal securities laws. There the purpose was
the assurance of liquidity, an essential means to the end of the lowest possible
cost of capital in a system characterized by widespread holding of securities.
III.

THE SCOPE AND NORMATIVE CONTENT OF REGULATION

Now let us check for the fit between the corporate law purposes just
identified and the dialectics described in debate categories (I) and (2). To
highlight the fit, this section traces the evolution of corporate legal theory. Two
theoretical paradigms dominated corporate law in the mid- to late-20 h century,
succeeding one another in time. The first, a trust paradigm, received
articulation in 1932 by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in The Modern
Corporation and Private Property. It was eclipsed around 1980 by a market
paradigm that originated in economics during the 1960s and 1970s. By now,
both have lost salience. In both cases the loss results from failure to adhere to
corporate law's bottom-line objectives.
Let us look first at Berle and Means. Enabling corporate law, they said, had
facilitated the appearance and success of the large, mass-producing,
management-controlled corporation. This had been a reactive rather than a
purposive development-a change that followed from underlying economic
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facts. But the law thereby had become implicated in the creation and
perpetuation of an unsatisfactory separation of ownership and control. The big
corporations of the 20 th century had split the classical entrepreneurial function
between salaried executives, who sat atop hierarchical organizations, and
anonymous equity participants, who held small stakes and prized market
liquidity over participation. This presented problems of competence and
responsibility absent in an ideal, classical capitalist world inhabited by selfemployed individual producers. In the classical model, market competition
effectively controlled the producers, constraining both the incompetent and the
greedy and legitimating private economic power. But corporate mass
production on a large capital base broke those parameters, with firms taking on
significant attributes and powers, social as well as economic. Industrial
oligarchs exercised unified control over the wealth under their charge, and the
law played a role in investing the power.5 Therefore, said Berle and Means,
corporate property should no longer be deemed private property. 6 That
assertion in turn supported a presumption favoring new regulation.
Berle and Means recommended no pervasive system of government
oversight, however. Instead they focused on the problem of management selfdealing in an enabling context. Corporate insiders were writing their own
contracts, with immunity clauses and waivers of shareholder rights allowing
much diversion of corporate profit to managers' pockets. 7 The law, said Berle
and Means, would do a better job if it were rewritten to follow basic principles
of trust law. More particularly, there should be a pervasive equitable limitation
on powers granted to corporate management (or any other group within the
corporation) by the enabling system: power should be exercisable only for the
ratable benefit of all the shareholders. 8 Berle and Means had in mind an
overarching standard that would constrain the enabling system ex post: no
language in a corporate charter could deny or defeat the fundamental equitable
control of the court.9 Meanwhile, enforcement of the equitable limitation safely
could be remitted to the state judiciary. In Berle and Means' view, charter
competition impacted only statutes, leaving the common law of fiduciary duties
as the one area of corporate law remaining robust: "[f]lexible and realistic"
could be expected to find solutions to
judges, "if untrammeled by statute,"
0
problems that demanded a remedy.'
While Berle and Means limited the trust paradigm's class of beneficiaries to

5.

ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY 4, 131 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932).
6. Id. at 219.
7. Id. at 128, 220, 312.
8. Id. at 220.
9. Id. at 242.

10. Id. at 197,295.
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the corporation's shareholders, many of their paradigm's subsequent
proponents expanded the zone of beneficiary to debate category (3) to include
other corporate constituents and the public interest. The "public"
characterization in The Modern Corporation and Private Property invited the
extension. So did the book's emphasis on managerial power: to mid-20th
century anti-managerialists, power implied responsibility and, given the
separation of ownership and control, responsibility needed to be imposed in
law.11
Events did not unfold in accordance with the Berle and Means description,
however. The "public" characterization never made the theory-practice
transition and the courts stubbornly refrained from casting themselves in the
role of management controllers. Fiduciary duty was in any event too narrow a
framework in which to integrate corporate law and management power into the
wider social and political context. Eventually, events overtook the trust
paradigm. By the 1970s, new views emerged about the best means to the
generally accepted end of creating wealth. A sense of national competitive
failure combined with a loss of faith in regulatory solutions to undermine the
trust paradigm.
Market displaced trust. The market paradigm rebutted both the trust
paradigm's description of separated ownership and control and its call for
regulation. This economic perspective recast the firm as an incident of
contracting among rational economic actors. The firm became a series of
contracts joining inputs to outputs, with equity capital as one of the inputs and
corporate law as a part of the input's governing contract.' 2 The imperfections
identified under the trust paradigm reemerged under the denomination "agency
costs," costs that firms must minimize due to the free market's competitive
force. Managers were no longer seen as empowered actors and responsibility
was no longer seen as a problem. When managers failed, they got removedeither a hostile offeror took over the company and threw them out,13 the firm
with a high agency-cost base failed to survive in the product market, or poor
managers failed to survive in the management labor market. Their incentives
accordingly were focused on long-run productive success for the firm. Given
these market deterrents, corporate property again became private, the
regulatory agenda went blank, and a powerful presumption arose against new
14
intervention.

11. See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 1, 7 (1976); see also Robert A.
Dahl, Governing the Giant Corporation,in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 2 (Ralph Nader & Mark
Green eds., 1972).

12. See Michael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure,3 J. FIN. ECON. 310 (1976).
13. This point originated in Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor CorporateControl, 73 J.
POL. ECON. 110 (1965).

14.

William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-ContractualCorporation,87 NW. U.
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The market paradigm presented an ideological mirror image to the trust
paradigm and accordingly suited deregulatory policy agendas. Indeed, that fit
alone should have carried it to unquestioned and continued ascendancy in
corporate law discussions. But it instead ran into an unanticipated public choice
problem when the enabling system transformed itself in the process of dealing
with hostile takeovers. Historically, corporate control always had been
contestable in the trading market. But, prior to the 1980s such contests as
occurred did not fundamentally challenge management empowerment. Low
stock market valuations changed that. Corporate law responded by interposing
frictions that substantially diminished the takeover threat and preserved
freedom of action for management. This undermined the market paradigm's
positive story, which relied on market contracting to import incentive
compatibility to the agency relationship.
The market paradigm also failed to synchronize with corporate law at a
normative level. Corporate law seeks to create wealth and looks at freedom of
contract only as a means to the end. The market paradigm's proponents stressed
individual freedom and contract as ends in themselves. But corporate law is not
a place were a commitment to individual freedom causes a zone of right to be
identified and protected for its own sake. Nor does corporate law's facilitation
of exchange imply something approaching the economic ideal of property
rights in a zone of free contract. Corporate law routinely suppresses alternative
contractual arrangements in order to secure its left- and right-side objectives.
The states' "enabling" codes build on a pair of core mandates. The delegation
of power to management is mandatory (the exception in Delaware General
Corporation Law 141 (a) being irrelevant to the governance of large firms), as is
management agenda control respecting the terms of the corporate contract.
Ultimate, albeit indirect, shareholder control also is mandated: one class of
shares must retain full voting rights. It also should be noted that corporate law
evolves in an ongoing process of identifying and correcting perceived contract
failures, again toward the end of clearing the field for management freedom of
action and market liquidity. State anti-takeover law performs the former
function. The federal corporate law regime performs the latter function,
protecting liquidity by requiring management truth-telling.
If there was an era in which free contract came close to describing
corporate law, it was the 1920s, after New Jersey stripped most of the mandates
from its corporate code in the late- 1 9 th century and before Congress enacted the
federal securities laws. But the meaning of free contract in corporate contexts
was evolving even in the 1920s away from the Victorian preference for
individual choice toward a more facilitative, majoritarian regime. Simply, deal-

L. REV. 180, 186-90 (1992).
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making by insiders trumped freedom of contract.1 5 With the exception of a
brief period around twenty years ago, when contractarianism was hotly debated
in corporate legal theory, no one has ever thought that the shareholder-manager
relationship could satisfactorily be dealt with in the legal framework of a
Victorian dicker over Dobbin, least of all the Victorians themselves.
The "nexus of contracts" corporation, then, never worked as description.
The contractarians' descriptive claims instead served as talking points in a
wider normative campaign against regulatory innovation, particularly in
fiduciary law. That anti-regulatory campaign retains vitality, pursuing the dual
goals of management freedom of action as against regulators and shareholder
choice as against management. Interestingly, the campaign now proceeds on
both fronts as a rearguard action. A quarter century of contractarian
reinforcement of the primacy of state law toward the end of protecting
management freedom from regulation made no difference when a Congress
frightened by voter disgust with corporate scandals enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. The battle over shareholder choice was lost during the 1980s, when antitakeover regulation chilled the market for corporate control. Although state law
never accords management freedom of action an absolute trump over
shareholder choice and mediates between the two, the underlay of charter
competition weights the mediation so as to render it relatively impervious to the
stronger normative claims of the contractarians and their economic theory of
agency.
No overarching meta-theory has succeeded the trust and market paradigms
to dominate thinking in the field. Even as welfare consequentialism prevails,
today no master set of instructions drives theoretical discussions about the
means to the end. Today's theorists tend to think in terms of incentive
compatibility and to confront incentive problems piecemeal. Management selfdealing reemerges as a serious problem. The trust paradigm's stress on
fiduciary instructions persists as a result. And its separation of ownership and
control remains in the operative description, no longer absolutely determinative
but still salient. The market paradigm's deregulatory presumption retains force,
although fewer and fewer observers look to spontaneous order to solve agency
problems. The nexus of contracts slowly recedes. But it will never disappear
because contract remains what it always has been: a significant component of
corporate arrangements. Meanwhile, hierarchy has returned to legal
descriptions of the firm. Economics remains the dominant interdisciplinary
referent, but the methodological menu is expanding. As ever, financial results

15. The development of the law of corporate reorganization followed similar lines. Before the
Bankruptcy Act of 1934, the federal courts' equity receivership maintained formal fidelity to individual
choice even as it sought in practice to facilitate recapitalizations on a cram-down basis. It took
Congressional intervention during the Depression to surmount the conceptual barrier and mandate a
majoritarian reorganization regime.

Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law
in history are the primary determinants. Meanwhile, debates retain a dialectic
quality, focused on the binaries in debate category (4).
IV. THE BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRM AND LEGITIMACY
The Criteria seek to touch all the bases, emerging as an exhaustive catalog
of normative possibilities. In so doing they sweep in precepts suggesting that
good laws for business associations should follow from and synchronize with
precepts prevailing in the wider system of public and private law. They do this
as they perform their primary job of establishing, encasing, and regulating
business organizations. Thus do fairness, redistribution, and protection of the
weak (I(C), (E), and (F)) vie with cost reduction (IV), and corporate power and
legitimacy in society (III) show up as concerns coequal with wealth creation
(II).
Corporate doctrine, however, is for the most part impervious to legitimacy
concerns. Corporate law does not attempt to confer legitimacy, even as it does
bestow limited liability. The incorporating states and their regime of general
incorporation long ago surrendered substantive review of the business project
in order to clear the field for action. Legitimacy is left to management to garner
or lose depending on how well it does its job, and the performance criterion is
financial. This ongoing process operates firm by firm and across firms as a
whole. State corporate law facilitates the process without determining the
result. It wants managers to succeed and so empowers them. But it anticipates
failure when it requires at least one class of shareholders to retain the vote. 16
Financial failure also tends to prompt additional securities regulation. The
venue is the securities regime rather than state law for three reasons. First,
failure registers most clearly in stock prices; secondly, financially embarrassed
managers have a tendency to fall out of compliance with the mandatory
disclosure regime; and, thirdly, charter competition tends to keep the states out
of the enforcement business. Contrariwise, the political clout of managers
waxes during strong stock markets, facilitating access to Congress and state
legislatures for beneficial regulation (or deregulation).
Real-world success and failure thus matter a great deal in corporate law,
defining legitimacy. But legitimacy in the higher sense of responsible
empowerment matters little. A negative proof is offered. If legitimacy mattered,
corporate law would find some plausible way to assign responsibility for
corporate externalities. Consider in this regard the law of piercing the veil,
which holds out the possibility of assigning responsibility for tortious
externalities to the firm's shareholders. These rules make perfect sense when
viewed from the point of view of classical doctrinal theory. Limited liability
16. Losers in a given firm get a backstop of sorts from the federal bankruptcy regime. But, across
bankrupt firms as a whole, the trend over time has been less forgiving.
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comes with entity status, and can be lost if the shareholders fail to respect the
entity's legal earmarks: if the firm is run as an "agent or instrumentality" of its
shareholders rather than as a separate entity, the shareholders' limited liability
can be lost. Yet, viewing the matter from the point of view of economic
substance, agency is what the enterprise is all about. There results a license to
externalize maintainable by rote observance of formalities. The result is
indefensible as a matter of economic theory, and questionable under a long list
of Criteria: avoidance of harshness (I(B)), redistribution (I(E)), protection of
the weak (I(F)), allocation of loss to the proper person (I(G)), evenhandedness
(1(1)), legitimation of management's role and exercise of power (Il1(E)), and
abuse of power (III(F)). Yet the core purposes of capital-raising and freedom of
action are much enhanced.
If legitimacy mattered, corporate law would not draw a bright line between
insiders and outsiders, disavowing all responsibility for the latter. It would find
ways to bring disempowered constituents into the tent. Its refusal so to do dates
back at least to Dodge v. FordMotor Co.17 Such exceptions as have opened up
serve the end of enhancing management's freedom of action rather than the end
of integrating corporate governance into the wider social settlement embodied
in regulation. Thus do the ALl Principles of Corporate Governance describe

the firm's objective with the hedged phrase "with a view to enhancing
corporate profit and shareholder gain.' 18 The hedge permits management to
effect distributions within the firm, relaxing the shareholder value norm at the
shareholders' expense without imposing duties of social responsibility. The
same goes for the corporate charity permission and the admission of constituent
interest in takeover defense contexts. The exceptions implicate redistribution
(I(E)) and protection of the weak (I(F)), but only on a spillover basis.
Corporate law's cavalier infliction of tortious externalities and insistence on
contract as the means of engagement by outsiders are tolerated only because
outside regulation makes significant adjustments to ameliorate unacceptable
results. Labor, environmental, and consumer protection regulation all serve this
end, not to mention the antitrust laws and the Internal Revenue Code. Their
common purpose is to contain the discretion vested in managers by corporate
law. This outside regulation makes the world safe for the corporate law
delegation and thereby makes firms and corporate law legitimate by
indirection. This inside/outside settlement dates back to the early-20th century,
survived the Depression intact, and today seems more stable than ever.
Still, the system is fully defensible in theory only on the assumption that the
backstop regulations adequately protect the public interest. The assumption

17. 170N.W. 668(Mich. 1919).
18. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES
RECOMMENDATIONS 2.01 (1994).
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remains highly contestable, causing the same to follow for corporate law's
investiture of power to go forth to injure and exploit. It follows that observers
who seek to integrate corporate law within models of democratic society are
never satisfied with the inside/outside settlement. Each generation renews the
category (3) debates concerning constituents and responsibility in the teeth of
the stable doctrinal settlement. The critics draw liberally on the Criteria. They
would avoid harshness (I(B)), promote fairness (I(C)), protect constituent
expectations (I(D)), redistribute wealth away from managers and shareholders
(I(E)), protect the weak (I(F)), promote evenhandedness (1(1)), insist on full
disclosure of the social consequences of corporate acts (I(J)), and promote
public involvement in business (Ill(C)), all toward the end of legitimizing
management power (III(E)).
This awkward system can be defended, and the Criteria bear on the case.
Caveat emptor (II(G)) looms large: if one is a constituent who does not enjoy
the special protection of one of the supplemental regulatory regimes, caveat
emptor is all corporate law holds out. Reference to the enforcement of private
bargains (I(A)) is more problematic. It is true that wealth transfers from
employees and senior security holders to managers and shareholders are
defended in contractual terms. But to look at the jurisprudence is to see results
obtained through formalistic interpretation of the bargains' contents.
Interpretation proceeds with no thought of avoiding harshness (I(B)), being fair
(I(C)), being evenhanded (I(l)), protecting the weak (I(F)), or, in some cases,
even effectuating the parties' expectations. Formalism prevails, making
winners of the empowered and losers of the powerless. The jurisprudence
smirks in its complicity. In corporate law, winning has its privileges and
optimality is always Kaldor-Hicks.
The best that can be said is that coherence is enhanced. The constituents
learn that they need to go somewhere other than corporate law for assistance.
Corporate law remains uncluttered with complex instructions that might inhibit
freedom of action or have unintended effects, triggering uncertainty (II(F)).
Corporate actors can rely on the division of regulatory function (I(D), IV(D)),
and things go much more smoothly and cheaply (IV(B) and (C)). There is a
legitimacy point too. The widespread acceptance of corporate law's lack of
evenhandedness does not really follow from deeply held contractarian beliefs
and free market partisanship. We value the end, not the means, and the end is
economic opportunity. Corporate law's consequential appeal to wealth creation
registers positively in the polity at some deep level. The median voter accepts a
system that aggressively divides us into winners and losers so long as it
identifies with the winners, or at least holds out a hope for a place for her
children in the winner's circle.
All of this suffices to put the burden of persuasion on the critics, who have
never managed to produce an alternative model that surmounts coherence
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objections and resonates in the context of our social settlement. They seem
always to end up in an awkward alliance of convenience with management
apologists, taking Dodd's side in the Berle-Dodd debate of 1932.19 In that
famous encounter, two progressives differed on the question as to how society
should deal with management power. Dodd had us modeling managers as
statesmen, appealing to their better instincts. Unfortunately for Dodd's case,
managers have not hewn to the statesmanlike path. Berle made an agency
argument: managers had to be controlled somehow and imposed fidelity to the
shareholder interest was the best means to the end. The next part takes up that
case.
V. AGENCY

Agency is corporate legal theory's flashpoint topic. The doctrine itself
triggers the debate by simultaneously dispensing the two organizational
models: entity, which privileges management empowerment; and agency,
which suggests shareholder-centered controls on management discretion. To
isolate the points of tension, return to the left side/right side picture of corporate
law's objectives.
On the left side of the balance sheet, corporate law mandates delegation and
invests management with discretion, letting success or failure emerge in
practice. It then makes a second mandate, remitting the vote for the board of
directors to the shareholders, expecting the vote's aggressive exercise in case of
failure. But the shareholder collective action problem makes the dual
dispensation problematic. Two great points of conflict arise. One goes to
shareholder access and the proxy solicitation process. The other concerns the
hostile takeover. The entity characterization and the end of encouraging risktaking and long-term investment suggest that existing barriers to shareholder
intervention well serve the end of wealth creation. The agency characterization,
with its corollaries of principal control and shareholder choice, suggest that a
stronger threat of removal and shareholder legislative intervention would
improve operating results.
Turning to the right side of the balance sheet, corporate law protects
liquidity, facilitating exit as the primary shareholder defense against adverse
selection problems. Management proponents focus or this, suggesting that the
old Wall Street Rule still suffices to protect the shareholder interest (and
simultaneously questioning the intensity of federal regulations designed to keep
the exit door open). But corporate law also seeks to reduce the cost of capital
on the right side, even as it accords management discretion over financing

19. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom CorporateManagers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L.
REV. 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L.
REV. 1145 (1932).
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decisions. This objective again raises the takeover question, with shareholder
choice advocates pointing to the cost of equity capital to counter the left-side
claim of perverse effects on investment incentives made by management's
defenders. Right-side questions come up about other terms of the agency
relation as well. Opportunistic managers can self-deal at the expense of the
marginal interest holder, causing the cost of equity capital to rise. To the extent
that the law can intervene to control such conduct cost-effectively, it arguably
should do so, even though the intervention entails review of management
decisions and constrains freedom of action. Here we enter the territory of the
duty of loyalty and the ongoing and always contested job of drawing the
territorial line between business judgment and transactional scrutiny.
Resolutions of disputes over the terms of the agency comprise the core
territory of the corporate law mediation. We have mediation rather than
solutions because both sides tell plausible stories about wealth impacts.
Apparent but unverified welfare gains and perverse incentives crop up
everywhere in this vicinity-the negative effects of management entrenchment
vie with those of the short-term focus of institutional shareholders; the
deadweight costs of management pocket-lining vie with those implicated by
systems of enforcement; and the beneficial financial effects of equal returns for
equally situated shareholders vie with the negative effects of constraints on
transactional freedom. We have no empirical means to determine correct,
across-the-board outcomes for disputes such as these. But, under the
deregulatory presumption bequeathed by the contractarians, the theoretical
burden of persuasion lies with those arguing for regulatory innovation.
Contemporary trends in the practice follow suit. Under the deregulatory
presumption, the focus devolves on governance processes, with heavy reliance
being placed on the institution of the board of directors. Self-regulatory
strategies prevail, their plausibility bolstered by the appearance of activist
institutional investors. We see this in the proliferation of voluntary codes of
good practice and accompanying hortatory discussions among governance
experts. We also see it in Delaware fiduciary law, which relies ever more
heavily on internal processes to solve conflict of interest problems. At the same
time, high-profile compliance failures by unsuccessful managers have
prompted politicians to embed self-regulatory governance agenda items in the
federal mandatory disclosure system. The overall result is anything but
deregulatory, feeding our dialectical debates.
The Criteria echo the dialectic. As we fill in the inevitable omitted terms in
the agency relationship, we could reference the Criteria to restrain ourselves,
emphasizing the enforcement of private bargains (I(A)) and freedom of action
(I(H)), and resolving doubts against regulatory innovation by protecting
expectations in announced governmental policies (I(D)). Alternatively, we
could enforce the traditional regime of fiduciary prohibition, guided by fairness
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(I(C)), the avoidance of harshness (I(B)), protection of the weak (I(F)), and
evenhandedness (1(1)). Continuing this back and forth, we could turn to selfregulation, maximizing self-enforcement (IV(B)) and limiting the cost of
government operation (IV(A)). But if we do that to excess, we end up relying
more and more on the gatekeepers-outside directors, auditors, and
counsel-increasing private compliance costs (IV(C)). In addition, in a
dynamic environment, self-regulation under judicial supervision tends to lead
to unstable case law, as seen in Delaware in recent decades. This traverses the
notion that we should not change the rules (II(F), IV(D)). In the present
environment, the only criterion bearing on agency that I would predict would
garner universal endorsement is full disclosure (I(J)). And even as to that, a
mandatory/enabling dispute would break out soon enough.
CONCLUSION

We will not know what good corporate law is until we have a verifiable,
generally accepted template for a productive governance. Meanwhile, we
debate our opinions on the matter, opinions highly sensitive to results in real
world firms. Caution prevails, favoring the inherited legal context.

